Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment by Cabrales, Antonio et al.
Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency:
An Experiment
Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie Claire Villeval
To cite this version:
Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness, Marie Claire Villeval. Hidden Information, Bargaining
Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment. Experimental Economics, Springer Verlag (Germany),
2011, 14 (2), pp.133-159. <halshs-00614472>
HAL Id: halshs-00614472
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00614472
Submitted on 11 Aug 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Hidden Information, Bargaining Power, And Efficiency: An Experiment 
 
 
Antonio Cabrales, Gary Charness and Marie Claire Villeval 
 
 
Published in Experimental Economics, 14(2), p.133-159, lead article 
 
 
Abstract: We devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of bargaining power 
on the design and the selection of contracts in a hidden-information context.  In our benchmark 
case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type.  In our second treatment, a 
principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between 
the contract menus offered by two principals.  We first show theoretically how different ratios of 
principals and agents affect outcomes and efficiency.  Informational asymmetries generate 
inefficiency.  In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these 
inefficiencies may disappear, but they are insensitive to the number of principals. In contrast, 
when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative 
number of agents because competition reduces the agents‟ informational monopoly power.  
However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple 
equilibria.  In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical 
predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a 
tendency to choose more „generous‟ (and more efficient) contract menus over time.  We find that 
competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition 
between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a “vital and lively field of 
economic research” (2001 Nobel Prize committee) for decades.  The classic „lemons‟ paper 
(Akerlof 1970) illustrated the point that asymmetric information led to economic inefficiency, 
and could even destroy an efficient market.  Since the seminal works of Vickrey (1961) and 
Mirrlees (1971), research on mechanism design has sought ways to minimize or eliminate this 
problem.
1
  In an environment with hidden information (sometimes characterized as adverse 
selection), each agent knows more about her
2
 „type‟ than the principal does at the time of 
contracting.  In the standard labor scenario, a firm hires a worker but knows less than the worker 
does about her innate work disutility.  Other typical applications include a monopolist who is 
trying to price discriminate between buyers with different (privately known) willingness to pay, 
or a regulator who wants to obtain the highest efficient output from a utility company with private 
information about its cost.
3
 
The fact that agents know their own ability levels while principals may not causes 
difficulties in contracting, as an agent may not choose the action that is in the best interest of the 
principal.  If outcomes are related to actions, firms with complete information could design „first-
best‟ contracts that theoretically induce truthful revelation of types and generate economic 
efficiency by making the contract contingent on the outcome.  However, in contracting under 
hidden information, the problem is how to induce the efficient action without observing the 
                                                 
1
 Applications include public and regulatory economics (Laffont and Tirole 1993), labor economics (Lazear 1999), 
financial economics (Freixas and Rochet 1997), business management (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), and 
development economics (Ray 1998).  
2
 Throughout this paper we assume that the principals are male and the agents are female. 
3
 One-shot contracts are common in consumer transactions.  In the public sector, government procurement is often 
conducted on a one-shot basis.   
 2 
agent‟s true type; in this case, it is typically necessary to devise „second-best‟ contracts that lead 
to separation of types, but which are somewhat distorted and less than fully efficient.   
In this paper we report the results of experiments designed to test the influence of 
competition when there is hidden information.  This can be seen as a question of organizational 
or institutional design – what effects do different rules and markets have on performance and 
efficiency?
4
  We examine how differing degrees of relative bargaining power between principals 
and agents affect outcomes and efficiency when there is a problem of hidden information.   
Our approach is to consider three environments that differ according to the type of 
competition present in the environment.  In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with 
one agent of unknown type.  In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, 
while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two 
principals.  Principals can choose to offer one of six feasible contract menus, which are held 
constant across our treatments; in turn, agents can select high or low effort, or reject the contract 
menu entirely and receive reservation payoffs.  We derive the equilibrium predictions for each 
environment and examine the outcomes in each treatment, ranking the institutions as a function 
of their relative efficiency, both in terms of effort and the probability of trade.  
In this respect theory provides a first answer.  To understand the theoretical efficiency 
ranking, it is important to realize that incomplete information in markets creates inefficiencies 
because the agents have a certain monopoly power.  More precisely, they are the sole „owners‟ of 
a valuable resource – information about their type.  We first show from a theoretical point of view 
how different degrees of bargaining power between principals and agents, related to various 
                                                 
4
 Although we use the standard static screening model, it is worth noting that Kanemoto and MacLeod (1992) 
examine the effect of competition in a dynamic environment and find that one obtains the first-best outcome if there 
 3 
degrees of competition in the market, affect outcomes and efficiency. In an environment where 
principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies may disappear, but they 
are insensitive to the number of principals. In an environment where agents compete to be hired, 
efficiency improves dramatically and increases in the relative number of agents because 
competition reduces the agents‟ informational monopoly power.  However, this environment also 
generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria, which may have 
important behavioral implications in the field if people have social preferences such as inequality 
aversion. 
Our experiment constitutes the first test of the impact of varying the relative bargaining 
power between principals and agents on the selection of contracts in the presence of both 
heterogeneous agents and hidden information.  Our results are mostly supportive of the theory 
and the major implication is that the bargaining power directly affects the choice of contract 
menus.  In comparison with environments in which there is no competition, our experiment finds 
that the institutional environment in which agents compete against each other improves efficiency 
as far as we consider the contracting pairs.   
Even though, in general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the 
theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment, there is a 
tendency to choose more „generous‟ (and more efficient) contract menus over time.  We find that 
competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition 
between agents generates the most efficient outcomes. We observe a fairly high degree of 
separation of agents‟ types in the choices made in response to the various contract menus; 
interestingly, with agent competition we observe the more able agents strategically foregoing the 
                                                                                                                                                              
is sufficient competition for workers, even with asymmetric information.  Perhaps there is some empirical analog to 
 4 
option that would pay them more (if they are chosen), in order to signal their type by choosing the 
option that less able agents should never choose.  Our data also show considerable evidence of 
changes in behavior over time, as participants learn what is effective and what is not. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: We review the relevant literature in 
section 2, and we describe our theoretical model and derive its predictions in section 3.  We 
present our experimental design and implementation in section 4, with the results given in section 
5.  We conclude in section 6. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Perhaps due to the complexity of business relationships, it is difficult to find support from 
field data for principal-agent theory.  While there has been considerable theoretical work on 
contracts in recent decades, empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce, particularly 
as far as hidden information is concerned.   The Prendergast (1999) and Chiappori and Salanié 
(2003) surveys show that the econometrics of contracts has recently become a burgeoning field of 
research.  However, the latter study points out that a number of empirical tests suffer from 
selection and endogeneity biases.  In addition, due to the lack of data on contracts many 
theoretical models have not yet been tested.  These difficulties explain why few empirical tests of 
the hidden-information problem are available in the literature (see notably Cawley and Philipson, 
1999; Chiappori and Salanié, 2000; Dahlby, 1983; Dione and Doherty, 1994; Finkelstein and 
Poterba, 2000; Genesove, 1993; Puelz and Snow, 1994; Young and Burke, 2001).  Given the 
difficulties inherent with field data in this area, laboratory experiments offer a complementary 
approach that offers some promise, since it is possible to isolate and vary the factors of interest 
                                                                                                                                                              
this result in the static case. 
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while keeping all others constant.  In this paper we use experimental methodology to empirically 
test a model of the ratchet effect for which no survey data are available. 
Previous experimental studies on asymmetric information have typically examined 
contracting with hidden action (moral hazard), where effort is not contractible (see notably 
Anderhub, Gächter, and Königstein, 2002; Berg, Daley, Dickhaut, and O‟Brien, 1992; Charness 
and Dufwenberg, 2006; DeJong, Forsythe, Lundholm, and Uecker, 1985; Keser and Willinger, 
2000; and Königstein, 2001).  However, there is little experimental work on contracting with 
hidden information about an agent‟s type.  A few studies confirm the existence of a market for 
“lemons” (see Lynch, Miller, Plott and Porter, 1986, in oral double auctions, and Holt and 
Sherman, 1990, in posted–offer auctions), while Brandts and Holt (1992) and Banks, Camerer 
and Porter (1994) provide mixed evidence in signaling games.  Miller and Plott (1985) show that 
market processes allow the buyers to extract private information from the sellers, in an 
environment in which the proportion of buyers varies but is never greater than the number of 
sellers.  Beyond market processes, it has also been shown that agents are more likely to select 
actions according to their types when more equitable menus are proposed (Cabrales and 
Charness, forthcoming, in the context of team production) and when communication is allowed  
(Charness and Dufwenberg, forthcoming).  Finally, a few articles (Chaudhuri, 1998; Cooper, 
Kagel, Lo, and Gu, 1999; and Charness, Kuhn, and Villeval, forthcoming) study the dynamic 
contracting problem.  However, we are unaware of any previous study that considers the effect of 
varying, in a static framework, the relative bargaining power in contracts with either excess 
principals or excess agents. 
One might predict that different relative bargaining power for principals and agents should 
lead to different contract menus being selected.  However, the evidence from the handful of 
 6 
experimental papers on the effects of unbalanced competition on the outcomes between principals 
and agents is somewhat mixed.  Fischbacher, Fong and Fehr (2009) demonstrate that the 
introduction of even a small amount of competition leads to large behavioral changes.  Roth et al. 
(1991) find that principals capture nearly the entire surplus when agents compete in a demand 
game, while Grosskopf (2003) shows, in an ultimatum bargaining game with responders‟ 
competition, that demands evolves more over time than in the game with no competition.  Davis 
and Holt (1994) find that the ability of a buyer to switch between sellers provides a strong 
incentive to develop reputation in a repeated game.  Charness, Kuhn and Villeval (forthcoming) 
show how competition can eliminate the ratchet effect.  In contrast, other studies find that 
competition does not eliminate fairness when contracts are incomplete (see Brandts and Charness, 
2004, and Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold, and Gächter, 1998).  Thus, it is not clear ex ante what 
effects competition will have on the static hidden-information problem.  This is even more the 
case when competition is unbalanced, with either excess firms or excess workers.  
3. THE MODEL 
In this section we describe the theoretical model that serves as the basis for the 
experimental design.  In this game, the principal offers one contract that is intended for low-
ability-type agents and one contract intended for high-ability-type agents; these contracts are 
designed such that the agents have an incentive to self-select the appropriate contract.  We vary 
the bargaining power by altering the relative proportion of principals and agents.  As a preview, 
we note that the case with competition between principals (more principals than agents) yields a 
solution that is invariant to the number of agents and is sometimes efficient.  On the other hand, 
the case of competition between agents is not invariant to the (relative) number of agents.  The 
 7 
presence of more agents relaxes the binding incentive-compatibility constraint (for the high-
ability type), yielding a level of effort that decreases towards the efficient level with the number 
of agents.  In the limit, the only relevant constraint for the high-ability type agent is the 
participation constraint.  As a result, there are no inefficiencies.  
Imagine that a firm needs one worker in order to be able to operate. The profits for the 
firm when it is operating are: 
 = e – w 
where e, w are the effort levels and wages of the worker.  Each worker has a utility function 
which depends on her ability type j  {H,L}, which is her private information: 
u
j
(e,w )  w 
k
j
2
e
2  
where kH = 1 and kL = k > 1.  That is, the high-ability agent has a lower cost of effort than the low-
ability type.  Thus, only the individual agent knows j, but e is observable and contractible.   
From the utility functions of the principal and the agents, the first-best effort levels are: 
eˆ
j

1
k
j
, j  H , L                              (1) 
We call eˆ
j
 the efficient level of effort.
5
  Let U  be the outside option of the worker (which 
we assume for simplicity to be type-independent); we can induce optimal effort, with: 
wˆ
j
 U 
1
2 k
j
, j  H , L     
If the (independent) probability that an agent is a high- or low-ability type is denoted 
respectively by p
H
 or p
L
, then the expected (optimal) profits for the principal are given by: 
                                                 
5
 This is an appropriate terminology because in all the Pareto-efficient allocations of this problem (with complete 
information) the level of effort is always eˆ
j
. This is so because of the quasi-linearity of the utility function of the 
agents, a common assumption in this field. Thus, the Pareto-efficient allocations only differ in the wages and profits 
of the principal and agent. 
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
E

p
L
2 k
L

p
H
2 k
H
 U  
In order to make some comparisons across treatments we hold this first-best contract fixed 
in all the treatments.  However, the second-best optimal equilibrium contracts, when the types are 
private information of the agents, depend on the structure of the market, which is our treatment 
variable.  Then the equilibrium contract menu in the Benchmark (B) treatment, with one principal 
and one agent, results from the solution of the maximization program:  
max
wH ,w L , eH , eL ,
p
H
(e
H
 w
H
)  p
L
(e
L
 w
L
)  
subject to 
w
H

k
H
2
e
H 
2
 U                      (IRH) 
w
L

k
L
2
e
L 
2
 U                        (IRL) 
w
H

k
H
2
(e
H
)
2
 w
L

k
H
2
(e
L
)
2  (ICH) 
     
     
where (IRj) and (ICj) are respectively the individual rationality and incentive compatibility 
constraints of an agent of ability type j   {H,L}.  As usual in these problems (see for example 
Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, ch.14C), it turns out that the active constraints in the 
optimal solution are (IRL) and (ICH), so that the solution is:  
e
H
B

1
k
H
 1; e
L
B

p
L
k
L
 k
H
(1  p
L
)

1
k
L

1  p
L
p
L
(k
L
 k
H
)
;
w
L
B
 U 
k
L
2
(e
L
B
)
2
; w
H
B

1
2
 w
L
B

1
2
(e
L
B
)
2
                                       (2) 
The high-ability type of agent provides the „efficient‟ level of effort and obtains utility 
above U .  These informational rents (rents are defined here as the utility an agent gets above her 
reservation utility) are equal to: 
w
L

k
L
2
(e
L
)
2
 w
H

k
L
2
(e
H
)
2
(IC
L
)
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    w
H
B

1
2
 U 
k
L
 1
2
(e
L
B
)
2                                             (2e) 
The effort of the low-ability type of agent is „inefficiently‟ low and she obtains no rents, 
because she is held to the reservation value (the (IRL) constraint is binding).  This is the subgame-
perfect equilibrium of this game. 
Assume now that the each principal is matched with three agents (this is the Excess 
Agent, or EA, treatment).  Then an equilibrium contract menu results from the solution of a 
slightly different maximization program.  Given that high-ability types are „harder-working‟ (they 
have a lower disutility of effort), they cost less per unit of output.  Thus when any of the matched 
agents chooses the contract designed for the high-ability type, the principal always chooses her.  
If more than one agent chooses the high contract, the principal chooses randomly among those 
selecting the high contract.
67
 
m ax
wH ,w L , eH , eL ,
(1  p
L
3
)(e
H
 w
H
)  p
L
3
(e
L
 w
L
)  
subject to 
w
L

k
L
2
e
L 
2
 U                                  (IRL) 
1  p
L 
2
3
 2
1  p
L  p L
2
 p
L
2





 w H 
k
H
2
e
H 
2




  1 
1  p
L 
2
3
 2
1  p
L  p L
2
 p
L
2





 U 
p
L
3
3
w
L

k
H
2
e
L 
2




  1 
p
L
3
3





 U
  (ICH)
              
The (ICH) can also be written 
                                                 
6
 We only write the binding constraints, in what follows. 
7 In our model the principal always prefers the high-ability agent. For this to be true we need to show: 
LHLH
eeww  , but because of the binding ICH ,   
LHLH
H
LH
eeee
k
ww 
2
, which means that 
LHLH
eeww   
is satisfied if   1
2

LH
H
ee
k . This is true because     1
1
2
2
2
22










H
H
H
H
LH
H
k
k
e
k
ee
k . 
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w
H

k
H
2
(e
H
)
2
 q w
L

k
H
2
(e
L
)
2




  (1  q )U                     (ICH) 
where q 
p
L
3
3
(1  p
L
)
2
3
 2
(1  p
L
) p
L
2
 p
L
2
.  The solution is now:  
e
H
EA

1
k
H
 1; e
L
EA

1
k
L

(1  p
L
)
3
p
L
3
q (k
L
 k
H
)
;
w
L
EA
 U 
k
L
2
(e
L
EA
)
2
; w
H
EA

1
2
 w
L
EA

1
2
(e
L
EA
)
2
                                 (3) 
The effort of the low-ability type of agent in the EA treatment, e
L
EA , is closer to the efficient 
effort ( eˆ
L
) than that in the B treatment ( e
L
B ).  To see this note that both e
L
EA  and e
L
B  are smaller than 
eˆ
L

1
k
L
; we now show e
L
EA
 e
L
B , so that the distortion is lower in EA than in B:  
e
L
EA

1
k
L

(1  p
L
)
3
p
L
3
q (k
L
 k
H
)
 e
L
B

1
k
L

1  p
L
p
L
(k
L
 k
H
)

(1  p
L
)
2
p
L
2
q  1                        (3‟) 
(1  p
L
)
2
p
L
2
q 
(1  p
L
)
2
p
L
2
p
L
3
3
(1  p
L
)
2
3
 2
(1  p
L
) p
L
2
 p
L
2

(1  p
L
)
2 p L
3
(1  p
L
)
2
3
 2
(1  p
L
) p
L
2
 p
L
2

(1  p
L
)
2 p L
3
(1  p
L
)
2
3
 1  
The reason for this enhanced efficiency is that the principal distorts the low-ability agent 
in order to lower the rents to the high-ability agent.  To see this, note that the informational rents 
in the Benchmark treatment (equation 2e) are increasing in e
L
B , so the principal prefers to lower 
e
L
B  (thus reducing efficiency) in order to get higher profits.  But in the EA treatment there is a 
competitive pressure on the high-ability types.  In fact, it is easy to check that in the general 
model where the principal confronts n agents, the difference between the equilibrium and the 
efficient level of effort for the low-ability type goes to zero as n goes to infinity.  
 11 
Nevertheless, there is an additional problem with this treatment.  We have found the 
equilibrium by assuming that the high-ability types assume that other high-ability types choose 
the high contract.  But that is not the unique equilibrium here.  In the second stage, where a menu 
is offered, it is also possible that both types of agents select the low option for the menu.  If all 
agents are choosing the low option, it is indeed a best response to choose low for all of them.  But 
in this case, it need not be optimal to propose the menu of contracts specified in (3).  In the design 
of the experiment we provide another menu, which is the equilibrium under the assumption that 
whenever there is multiplicity of equilibria in the second stage, the worst equilibrium for the 
principal is selected.  The equilibrium menu in that case would solve: 
m ax
wH ,w L , eH , eL
1  p
L
3  eH  w H  p L
3
e
L
 w
L  ,  
subject to 
w
L

k
L
2
e
L 
2
 U           (IRL)                        (4) 
w
H

k
H
2
(e
H
)
2

1
3
w
L

k
H
2
(e
L
)
2




 
2
3
U            (ICH) 
where the incentive constraint now ensures that it is dominant to choose the high option for a 
high-ability type (thus she will do it independently of what other individuals of her type are 
doing).
8
  Choosing the high contract when the low contract gives a higher payoff makes sense to 
reduce competition from other workers.  In fact the „attractiveness‟ of the high contract increases 
with the probability that a competing worker also chooses the high option.  So the worst-case 
                                                 
8
  If the contract offered by the principal did not satisfy the (ICH) constraint in program (4), there would be a pooling 
equilibrium in the contract acceptance subgame, where both the H and L types would accept the L contract.  To see 
this, notice that the utility for the H type of accepting the H contract would be: w
H

k
H
2
(e
H
)
2 , since by being the only 
agent departing from the pooling strategy, he would guarantee being chosen.  On the other hand, if he chose to accept 
the L contract he would get a utility of: 1
3
w
L

k
H
2
(e
L
)
2




 
2
3
U
, since he would only be chosen one-third of the time.  
Thus, if the (ICH) constraint in program (4) is violated it is indeed optimal for the H type to pool with the L type.  If 
 12 
scenario for the principal is when no competitor chooses the high contract.  If even in that case a 
high type should choose the high over the low contract, then it is dominant for a high-ability type 
to choose the high option, and that is exactly what the ICH constraint in equation (4) does.  
   Finally, we also have a treatment (Excess Principals, or EP) where two principals compete 
for one agent.  In that case, competition among principals forces the equilibrium of the game to 
give agents the maximum possible rents subject to incentive compatibility. A candidate for 
equilibrium would thus be a menu of contracts where agents make the efficient level of effort and 
principals make zero profits for each type of contract. 

e
H
EP
 w
H
EP
; e
L
EP
 w
L
EP
;
e
L
EP

1
k
L
;      e
H
EP

1
k
H
             (5) 
We just need to check at this point that this menu of contracts is incentive compatible to show 
that it is an equilibrium.
9
 This is true whenever: 
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2
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2
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







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







L
H
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H
H
k
k
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k
k
                         (6) 
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 But notice that (6) and (7) are equivalent to 









LH
H
kk
k
11
2
1
1               (8) 
1
11
2
1









LH
L
kk
k               (9) 
 
One can easily check that (8) and (9) are indeed satisfied for the parameters of our 
experiment, kL =2, kH =1.  
                                                                                                                                                              
the pooling equilibrium is always selected when available, the optimal way to screen types is given by the solution to 
(4).  As usual, one still has to check that screening types is optimal for the principal. 
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We implemented the theoretical model in our experiment by choosing a single set of six 
menus allowable in all contracts.  For the parameter values kL =2, kH =1, pL =1/2, equation (3) 
leads to menu 1, equation (4) induces menu 2, equation (2) leads to menu 3, and equation (5) 
induces menu 6.
10
  We provide the details of these mappings into experimental payoffs in section 
3.  In addition we chose two non-equilibrium menus, in order to provide a richer contractual 
environment.  Menu 4 is similar to menu 3, but has a little more effort for the low-ability type, 
and respects the IC constraint for the high-ability type.  Menu 5 is fully efficient, for both types.   
Each menu consisted of a choice of two (enforceable) effort levels and payments that 
depend on the type of agent involved; if neither choice seemed attractive to the agent, she could 
veto the contract menu.  We chose kL = 2 for all menus, in order to give relatively large rents to 
the high-ability type (under her preferred contracts).  The parameters, efforts, and wages for the 
six different menus in the experiment are summarized in Table 1: 
Table 1 – Parameter Values 
Menu kL pL eH eL wH wL 
1 2 1/2 1 0.36 0.64 0.25 
2 2 1/2 1 0.23 0.64 0.18 
3 2 1/2 1 0.33 0.70 0.25 
4 2 1/2 1 0.4 0.75 0.33 
5 2 1/2 1 0.50 0.85 0.44 
6 2 1/2 1.50 0.50 1.50 0.50 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
 This equilibrium can be shown to be unique. See, e.g. von Siemens (2010), who shows this in Proposition 2 for a 
more general version of this model. 
10
 Due to a misunderstanding, the correct theoretical parameter values were not used for Menus 5 and 6.  Instead of 
these menus, there should be a menu with parameters eH = 1, eL = 0.5, wH = 1 and wL = 0.5.  This would be the 
equilibrium menu in the excess-principals treatment.  Nevertheless, given the available menus in Table 3, Menu 6 is 
the equilibrium one in the EP treatment, as it is the menu that leads to the highest utility for the agents and it is 
incentive compatible. The only real difference is that the rents for the high-type agent are somewhat smaller. 
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One of the criticisms of models of contract design with hidden information is that the 
contract menus are more „complex‟ than one observes in reality.  In an environment like ours, 
these often employ a nonlinear structure and a very large number of possible choices of pairs of 
wages and efforts.  Using a continuous strategy space would be quite complicated to design for 
the principal, and even the choice of the agent would not be simple without adding much insight; 
this would also make the data analysis problematic.  We have selected a relatively small number 
of menus of contracts; since they include all forms of equilibrium in some versions of the game, 
this number is sufficiently large for exploring how the choice of contracts is affected by relative 
bargaining power.   While we have selected a very simple structure (only two types), we feel that 
a „simple‟ menu can serve as an approximation for a full schedule.  
4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We conducted three different treatments, which differed according to the numbers of 
principals and agents in the treatment to study how offered contracts depend on the structure of 
bargaining power.  In our B treatment, there were 10 principals and 10 agents in each session.  In 
the EA treatment, there were four principals and 12 agents, while in the EP treatment, there were 
12 principals and six agents.
11
  In all cases, there were equal numbers of high-ability (H) agents 
and low-ability (L) agents and this was made common knowledge among the participants.  In 
order to observe roughly similar numbers of observations (matches) in each treatment, we 
conducted four sessions of the EA treatment, three sessions of the EP treatment, and two sessions 
of the B treatment.  Each session consisted of 40 periods of play to allow for possible learning 
                                                 
11
 We chose three agents per principal in the EA treatment because the theoretical model shows that the distortion 
between the efficient level of effort and the equilibrium effort reduces in the number of competing agents; in addition, 
it increases the probability to be matched with at least one high agent. In the EP treatment, we chose to match two 
principals with one agent, as the theoretical predictions are unaffected by adding more principals. 
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dynamics, with random and anonymous re-matching after every period.  The re-matching 
procedure was common information to the participants.   
The organization of our sessions is summarized in Table 2.  The participants were 
privately informed of their roles; agents were also informed of their type.  One‟s role and/or type 
were kept constant throughout the session.  The participants also knew that there were the same 
number of L and H agents in the room. 
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Table 2 – Treatments and sessions 
Treatment 
Participants per session 
Sessions Periods Observations 
Principals H-agents L-agents 
Benchmark  10 5 5 2 40 800 
Excess Agent 4 6 6 4 40 640 
Excess Principal 12 3 3 3 40 720 
Total 72 43 43 9 - 2160 
 
In our B treatment, the “proposer” (principal) first makes a selection from among the six 
“offers” (feasible contract menus).  The “responder” (agent) is informed of this choice, and then 
selects “option X” (high contract), “option Y” (low contract), or rejects the contract menu.  Each 
person then learns his or her payoff and play then continues on to the next period.  The sequence 
in the EA treatment is similar, except that the principal is informed of the options chosen by each 
of the three agents and then selects one of these agents.  No agent is informed about the choices 
of the two other agents. The EP treatment has the same sequence as the B treatment, with the 
proviso that an agent can accept at most one offer from the two principals with whom she is 
paired. When both principals make the same offer, the agent chooses at random between them if 
she is willing to accept the offer.  The principal is not informed of the offer of the other principal. 
We used the parameter values in Table 1 to generate experimental payoffs for the feasible 
contract menus.  We first derived the payoffs from these parameters to three decimals and then 
multiplied these by one thousand.  We next rounded these payoffs to the nearest multiple of 5.  In 
the case of the principals, we added 250 to each of the non-rejection payoffs; this reflects the 
notion that setting up the firm requires some capital, and the minimum level of revenues that are 
needed to recoup the cost of capital is 250.  In the case of the agents, we added 10 to each non-
rejection payoff, in order to provide some minimal separation (avoiding the possibility of 
equilibrium failure due to indifference) between the payoff for a low agent who accepts the least 
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favorable offer and her payoff from rejecting the contract menu in its entirety.
12
  Unmatched 
principals or agents received 125 points in the period.
13
  This process leads to Table 3: 
Table 3 – Payoff Table 
 Option X Option Y Reject 
                      P  610 355 125 
    Menu 1     H 150 200 125 
                      L -350 135 125 
   
                      P  605 305 125 
    Menu 2     H 155 160 125 
                      L -345 135 125 
   
                      P  550 335 125 
    Menu 3     H 210 200 125 
                      L -310 145 125 
   
                      P  500 350 125 
    Menu 4     H 260 230 125 
                      L -240 160 125 
   
                      P  400 310 125 
    Menu 5     H 360 325 125 
                      L -140 200 125 
   
                      P  250 250 125 
    Menu 6     H 385 385 125 
                      L -740 260 125 
 
A form of Table 3 was distributed to the subjects to help them to make their decisions.
14
 
The sessions were conducted at the Groupe d‟Analyse et de Théorie Economique 
                                                 
12
 As it happens, we inadvertently added 20 points to the L payoffs from option Y with menu 4.  Perhaps this turns 
out to be useful for testing what is needed to obtain efficiency. The reason is that even with this extra kick, the B 
treatment is least efficient once rejections are considered. Thus, there is an argument that competition between agents 
is good for efficiency because it reduces informational rents, both in theory and in practice. And that principal 
competition enhances efficiency as it reduces the envy-driven rejections that hurt efficiency in the benchmark. 
13
 We note that adding the same constant to the payoffs for all agents or to the payoffs for all principals cannot 
change the equilibrium, since these are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities. 
14
 See the instructions in Appendix A. 
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(GATE), Lyon, France.  Participants were recruited from undergraduate courses in local 
Engineering and Business schools using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004).  All the participants were 
inexperienced in this type of game and no one participated in more than one session.  On average, 
a session lasted 60 minutes, including initial instructions.  The experiment was computerized 
using the REGATE program developed at GATE (Zeiliger, 2000).   We used a conversion rate of 
100 points for each Euro.  At the end of each session, we selected randomly four of the 40 periods 
for actual payment.  In this way, we avoided possible income effects from having already 
accumulated a known amount of money in the session.   The average payoff was 14.9 Euros in 
the B treatment, and 13.5 Euros in both the EA and the EP treatments; on average the principals 
received 17 Euros, the high-ability agents 13 Euros and the low-ability agents 10 Euros, including 
a four Euro show-up fee.
 
 
5. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
An overview of our experimental results is that we find substantial treatment effects in our 
sessions, with large differences in the contract menus offered and accepted, substantially in line 
with the equilibrium predictions.  The menus that are offered (and accepted) evolve over time.  In 
general, rejections and competition drive behavior.  We first give descriptive statistics for 
principal behavior and agent behavior.  We then consider the determinants of such behavior, 
providing statistical tests and regression analysis. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Principal behavior 
While there is certainly heterogeneity present among the principals, we do observe some 
clear patterns and differences for the menus chosen in each treatment.  Table 4 lists the menus 
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offered in each treatment; the left panel considers the full 40 periods of the game, while the right 
panel considers only the last 20 periods to show the evolution of contract offers over time. 
Table 4 – Menus offered by treatment  
Menu 
Menus offered in all periods Menus offered in the last 20 periods  
B treatment  EA treatment EP treatment B treatment  EA treatment EP treatment 
1 89 (11.12) 181 (28.28) 56 (3.89) 29 (7.25) 75 (23.44) 14 (1.94) 
2 17 (2.12) 34 (5.31) 28 (1.94) 7 (1.75) 14 (4.38) 9 (1.25) 
3 242 (30.25) 348 (54.38) 57 (3.96) 103 (25.75) 199 (62.19) 23 (3.19) 
4 361 (45.13) 58 (9.06) 136 (9.44) 218 (54.50) 24 (7.50) 42 (5.83) 
5 75 (9.38) 16 (2.50) 490 (34.03) 36 (9.00) 7 (2.19) 191 (26.53) 
6 16 (2.00)   3 (0.47) 673 (46.74) 7 (1.75) 1 (0.31) 441 (61.25) 
Total 800 (100) 640 (100) 1440 (100) 400 (100) 320 (100) 720 (100) 
Note: Equilibrium menus are in bold and percentages are in parentheses. 
        
Table 4 provides some support for the equilibrium predictions, as 30.25% of the menus 
offered in the B treatment, 33.59% of the menus offered in the EA treatment, and 46.74% of the 
menus offered in treatment EP are equilibrium menus (menus 1 and 2 with EA, menu 3 with B, 
and menu 6 with EP).  However, the mode of the distribution corresponds to the equilibrium 
menu only in the EP treatment.  Indeed, menu 4 is the most common choice in the B treatment 
(45.13% of the offers) and menu 3 is the most common choice in the EA treatment (54.38% of the 
offers).  As these menus offer a more egalitarian distribution than the equilibrium menus in both 
the B and EA treatments and also provides greater efficiency (higher total payoffs), one might 
suspect that social preferences such as those expressed in the Charness and Rabin (2002) model 
play a role here.  However, if these deviations were only driven by the principals‟ intrinsic social 
preferences, we should expect to observe them from the beginning of the game.  Instead, the 
menus offered evolve over time, as indicated by the right panel of Table 4.   
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Indeed, in both the B and the EA treatments, the contracts offered deviate from the 
equilibrium even further in the last 20 periods.  In this set of periods, menu 4 represents 54.50% 
of the offers and the equilibrium menu 3 only 25.75% of the offers in the B treatment; menu 3 
represents 62.19% of the offers while the equilibrium menus 1 or 2 represents only 27.82% of the 
offers on the EA treatment.  Since it is the ex ante more generous menus that grow in frequency 
over time, it seems that some other force is inducing principals to choose them more often over 
time, even though principals‟ social preferences possibly also account for these choices.  This is 
not contradicted by the observations from the EP treatment, since if the share of the equilibrium 
menu 6 increases over time (representing 46.74% across all periods but 61.25% in the last 20 
periods), this menu also corresponds to the most generous menu.  
While we postpone an in-depth analysis of the determinants of the contract menu choices, 
it appears that the profitability of a particular contract menu depends greatly on the environment.  
We find that menus 1 and 2 yield among the highest average profits to the principals in the EA 
treatment (516 and 528 points, respectively), but generate among the lowest average profits in the 
B (270 and 210 points, respectively) and EP treatments (146 and 125 points, respectively).  
Similarly, menu 6 is quite unattractive for the principal in the EA and B treatments (yielding 250 
points on average in both), but provides nearly the best profits in EP (214 points compared to 219 
provided by menu 5).  Overall, we observe a good correspondence between the most frequent 
offers made and their profitability.  For example, menu 4 ex post yields higher profits for the 
principals than the equilibrium menu 3 in the B treatment (392 vs. 334 points).  Thus, to a large 
extent, it seems that principals are influenced by considerations of their own profits. 
Agent behavior 
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The menus accepted by the agents naturally mirror the menus that were offered; however, 
there are some substantial differences, due primarily to rejections in the B treatment and selection 
pressures in the EP treatment.  Table 5 displays the number of accepted contracts and the 
acceptance rate for each menu, by treatment and by agent‟s type.  In total, there are 800 
observations in the B treatment, 1920 in the EA treatment (since there is one offer for three 
agents), and 1440 observations in the EP treatment (since there are two principals for one agent). 
Table 5 – Acceptance rates, by treatment and type 
Menu Offer B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment 
 High type Low type   High type Low type   High type Low type   
1 36/45  
(80) 
18/44  
(41) 
271/286 
(95) 
212/257 
(82) 
1/20   
(5) 
4/36 
 (11) 
2 6/10  
(60)  
2/7  
(29)  
46/49  
(94) 
47/53  
(89) 
0/11   
(0) 
0/17   
(0) 
3 97/103  
(94)  
85/139  
(61)  
513/522 
(98) 
446/522  
(85) 
2/23   
(9) 
2/34   
(6) 
4 191/200  
(96)  
134/161 
(83)  
82/82  
(100) 
92/92  
(100) 
10/59  
(17) 
18/77  
(23) 
5 37/37  
(100) 
36/38  
(95) 
16/16  
(100) 
32/32  
(100) 
102/260  
(39) 
99/230  
(43) 
6 5/5  
(100) 
11/11  
(100) 
5/5  
(100) 
4/4  
(100) 
245/347  
(71) 
235/326 
(72) 
Total 372/400  
(93)  
286/400 
(72)  
933/960 
(97) 
833/960  
(87) 
360/720  
(50) 
358/720 
(50) 
Note: These numbers represent accepted contracts over offered contracts. Equilibrium menus are in bold 
and percentages are in parentheses.  
 
 When they accept an offer, low-ability agents rarely (14 of 1477 times for all treatments 
pooled together, or 0.95%) chose option X (high effort), which would generate negative earnings.  
The behavior of high-ability agents is more complex.  Note that option X pays more than option 
Y for high-ability types with menus 3-5, but option Y pays more with menus 1 and 2.  In addition, 
both options give the same payoff to the high-ability type with menu 6.  In the EP treatment, 
high-ability agents nearly always maximize own payoffs (356 of 360 non-rejections).  While they 
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also do so with menus 1, 2, 5, and 6 in treatment B, we observe a substantial proportion of option-
Y choices with menus 3 and 4 (42% and 21% of the non-rejection choices, respectively).   In the 
EA treatment, the principals know the agents‟ choices prior to selecting one, so that agents must 
compete in their choices to be selected.  High-ability agents do maximize own profits with menus 
3-5, since this maximization also coincides with maximizing the profits for the principal.  
However, with menus 1 and 2, an agent who myopically chooses option Y runs the risk that she 
will not be selected if another agent has chosen option X.  Since some agents appear to realize 
this, we see that 64% of the high-ability agents choose option X when accepting menus 1 or 2.  
There is some evidence of learning over time as this percentage increases from 58% in the first 20 
periods to 73% in the last 20 periods.  In contrast, in response to the offer of menu 3, the 
corresponding percentage (95%) for choosing option X is stable over time.   
As a consequence of these decisions, the proportion of high-ability agents actually 
recruited is larger in EA (81%) than in B (57%).  While in B this distortion of the initial 
distribution of the population reflects the higher frequency of rejections of offers by low-ability 
agents, in EA this reflects the process of selection related to the competitive environment.  In EP, 
the proportion of high-ability agents (50%) corresponds roughly to the initial distribution of the 
population since almost all the agents accept an offer.   
5.2 Regression analysis 
We now turn to multiple-regression analysis of the determinants of the observed behavior 
in each treatment, first considering the menus offered by principals.
 15,16
  
                                                 
15
 All of these estimations used robust standard errors and clustering at the individual level to account for the fact that 
a same individual makes several decisions over time. 
16
 We also performed nonparametric Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, with both session-level and individual-level data 
(see Appendix B).  These tests find that the average menu offered is lowest in the EA sessions and highest in the EP 
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Principal behavior 
In order to disentangle the motivations underlying offers of the different categories of 
menus in the B treatment, we estimate a multinomial Logit model in which the reference category 
of the dependent variable is the offer of the equilibrium menu 3 (see the first three columns of 
Table 6).  The two other categories correspond either to the offer of menu 1 or 2, or to the offer of 
menu 5 or 6.  This model does not make any assumption about the order between the menus 
offered.  Next, we estimate multinomial Logit models to explain the offer of the most frequent 
contract, i.e. menu 4 in the B treatment (see the last two columns in Table 6).  The reference 
category is the offer of menu 4 both in period t and in period t-1.  The other categories correspond 
to the switch to menu 4 in period t from menus 1, 2 or 3 offered in period t-1 and to the switch to 
menu 4 from menus 5 or 6 offered in period t-1.   
Table 6: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Benchmark Treatment 
Baseline 
treatment 
Ref.: Offer of the equilibrium menu 3 Ref.: Offer of the most frequent 
menu 4 in both t-1 and t 
Offer of 
menus 1 - 2 
Offer of 
menu 4 
Offer of 
menus 5 - 6 
Switch from 
menus 1,2 or 3 
in t-1 
Switch from 
menus 5 or 6  
in t-1 
Time trend  
 
Current 
rejection rate 
X option 
chosen in (t-1) 
Constant 
-0.051** 
(0.023) 
0.043** 
(0.022) 
-1.366*** 
(0.432) 
-0.376 
(0.440) 
0.057*** 
(0.014) 
-0.053** 
(0.022) 
0.176 
(0.171) 
-0.053 
(0.292) 
0.008 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.020) 
-0.355 
(0.334) 
-1.183*** 
(0.462) 
-0.080*** 
(0.022) 
0.044
#
 
(0.027) 
-1.557*** 
(0.457) 
0.216  
(0.526) 
-0.041*** 
(0.015) 
0.045 
(0.029) 
-0.765*** 
(0.257) 
-1.467** 
(0.587) 
Nb obs. 641 316 
                                                                                                                                                              
sessions.  They also indicate that rejection rates of menus below 4 are significantly higher in the B than in the EA 
treatments and that high-ability agents in B are more likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 than in 
EA, the reverse being true for menu 3.  Overall, they show that the proportion of high-ability agents is higher in EA 
than in B. 
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Log-likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
Pseudo R
2 
-701.339 
38.06 
0.000 
0.087 
-200.879 
65.26 
0.000 
0.112 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** and ** denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 
and 5% level, respectively. 
#
 indicates borderline significance at 10.2% level. 
In all the regressions, the independent variables include a time trend (i.e. the period 
index).  They also control for the agent‟s choice of high effort (option X) in the previous period 
and the current rejection rate (defined as the current proportion of periods in which an offer from 
the principal has been rejected).  These three variables are intended to capture how principals 
modify their behavior depending on their cumulative experience over time. 
Relative to the equilibrium menu 3, menus 1 and 2 are chosen less frequently over time.  
A principal who experiences a high proportion of rejections of his previous offers is more likely 
to offer menus 1-2 and less likely to offer menu 4.  This may suggest some inertia in behavior.  
Indeed, a principal who is driven by social preferences makes more generous offers, experiences 
fewer rejections, and is encouraged to continue to offer generous menus.  An agent choosing the 
X option in the previous period decreases the likelihood of menu 1 or 2 being chosen by the 
principal as offering these menus would induce both types to switch to the low option.   
The last two columns show that switching from any menu to the most frequent menu 4 is 
more frequent at the beginning of the game.  It is less likely if the agent has chosen the X option 
in the previous period.  The experience of a high proportion of rejections in the past exerts a 
borderline significant effect on switching from menus 1, 2 or 3 to the more generous menu 4.  In 
contrast, offering very generous menus 5 or 6 is not conditioned on these variables and could be 
motivated by an unconditional preference for more egalitarian outcomes (or a fear of rejection 
without having previously experienced this rejection).  
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Table 7 presents the estimates of two multinomial Logit models studying the determinants 
of the menus chosen in the Excess Agent treatment.  In the first model, the reference category is 
the offer of the equilibrium menus 1 or 2 pooled together.  The first two columns correspond 
respectively to the offer of menu of 3 and the offer of menus 4 to 6 (pooled, since they represent 
only 12% of the observations).  The second model studies the determinants of the switch to the 
most frequent menu offered.  The reference category is the offer of menu 3 in both periods t-1 and 
t.  The other categories correspond to the switch to menu 3 in period t from menus 1 or 2 offered 
in period t-1 and to the switch to menu 3 from menus 4, 5 or 6 offered in period t-1.  The 
independent variables include a time trend and the choice of option X in the previous period, 
which is also interacted with the equilibrium menu.  We do not consider the lagged rejection rate 
since all the contracts are accepted.  
Table 7: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Agent Treatment 
Excess-Agent 
treatment 
(Multinomial 
Logit) 
Ref.: Offer of the 
equilibrium menu 1-2 
Ref.: Offer of the most frequent 
menu 3 in both t-1 and t 
Offer of 
menu 3 
Offer of 
menu 4, 5 or 
6 
Switch from 
menus 1,2 in t-1 
Switch from 
menus 4, 5 or 6 
in t-1 
Time trend 
 
X option chosen 
in (t-1) 
X option * menu 
1-2 in (t-1) 
Constant 
0.019** 
(0.009) 
1.673*** 
(0.464) 
-3.679*** 
(0.738) 
-0.235 
(0.473) 
-0.021 
(0.013) 
0.345 
(0.369) 
-2.228*** 
(0.695) 
-0.121 
(0.456) 
-0.022 
(0.020) 
-1.885*** 
(0.342) 
- 
 
-0.253 
(0.440) 
-0.040* 
(0.022) 
-0.183 
(0.744) 
- 
 
-1.432* 
(0.801) 
Nb obs. 
Log-likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
Pseudo R
2 
624 
-466.574 
34.39 
0.000 
0.212 
345 
-187.251 
39.62 
0.000 
0.074 
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Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; ***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Menu 3 is chosen more frequently over time whereas the frequency of menus 4-6 
decreases but not significantly.  If the X option was chosen in the previous period in response to 
the offer of the equilibrium menu, this decreases the likelihood of non-equilibrium menus being 
offered; since the X option leads to a higher payoff for the principal, there is less motivation to 
offer a more generous menu.  On the other hand, if the X option was chosen in t-1 (in reaction to 
whichever offers), this increases the likelihood of menu 3 being chosen.  If we separate out the 
case when menu 3 is chosen (columns 3 and 4), we see that switching from the equilibrium menu 
1-2 to menu 3 is much less likely when the X option has been chosen in the previous period. 
Table 8 presents first the estimates of a multinomial Logit model studying the 
determinants of the menus chosen in the Excess Principal treatment.  The reference category is 
the offer of the equilibrium menu 6.  The first two columns correspond respectively to the offer of 
menus 1 to 4 (pooled together since they only represent 19% of the observations) and to the offer 
of menu 5.  The third column displays the results of a Logit model in which the switch from 
menus 1 to 5 to the most frequent (and equilibrium) menu offer is the explained variable.  We 
include among the independent variables both the acceptance of the principal‟s offer in t-1 and 
the current rejection rate (as defined above) instead of the lagged option chosen by the agent, in 
order not to eliminate half of the observations and because both the principal and the high-type 
agent are indifferent between the two options with menu 6.  
The offer of less egalitarian menus than menu 6 decreases strongly over time.  Although 
the acceptance of the offer in the previous period has little effect on the choice of any kind of 
menu, there is a strong and positive correlation between a high rejection rate in the past and the 
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offer of less generous menus.  In contrast, the Logit regression regarding switching to menu 6 
shows that an offer rejected in the previous period makes such a switch more likely, while the 
overall current rejection rate exerts is no longer significant.  The switch is also more likely in the 
early periods of the game.  The competitive pressure to choose a favorable menu is naturally a 
major factor in the principal‟s choice of contract to offer. 
Table 8: Determinants of the choice of menus in the Excess Principal Treatment 
Excess-Principal 
treatment 
Ref.: Offer of the equilibrium menu 6 
(Multinomial Logit) 
Probability to switch 
from menus 1-5 in t-1 
to menu 6 (Logit) Offer of menus 1-4 Offer of menu 5 
Time trend 
 
Acceptance of 
the offer in (t-1) 
Current rejection 
rate 
Constant 
-0.083*** 
(0.011) 
-0.166 
(0.223) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
-0.929* 
(0.517) 
-0.062*** 
(0.010) 
0.111 
(0.175) 
0.012 
(0.010) 
0.392 
(0.516) 
-0.069*** 
(0.013) 
-3.202*** 
(0.329) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
0.971 
(0.879) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
Pseudo R
2
 
1404 
-1312.510 
125.25 
0.000 
0.090 
671 
-267.631 
103.66 
0.000 
0.352 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; *** and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1% 
and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Agent behavior 
We next analyze the agents' decisions of whether to accept a contract menu and which 
option to choose if accepting a contract.  Table 9 reports the estimates of the probability of 
accepting an offer, using Probit regressions with robust standard errors and clustering at the 
individual level.  Model (1) pools the data from the B and EA treatments and the next three 
models consider each treatment separately.   Note that regarding the EP treatment, we explain the 
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likelihood of an acceptance from the principal‟s and not from the agent‟s point of view since, 
with the exception of two rejections of both offers, the agent always accepts one offer and selects 
the best one among the two, or chooses at random in case of a tie.  
The independent variables include a time trend to control for the evolution of behavior 
over time and the agent‟s type.  They also include the menus offered in the current and in the 
previous periods (except in EP since we consider the principal‟s point of view).17  Indeed, 
although not predicted by the model, it is possible that the likelihood of accepting an offer is 
affected by the quality of offers experienced in the past.  Finally, in the regression for the EA 
treatment we also control for the relative frequency of no selection in the previous periods, as it 
may affect the current decision of accepting an offer whatever the menu offered. 
Table 9: Determinants of accepting a contract offer (Probit models) 
 
Decision to accept the 
offer 
B and EA 
Treatments  
(1) 
Benchmark 
Treatment 
(2) 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
(3) 
Excess Principal 
Treatment 
(4) 
Time trend 
 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
High-type agent 
 
Menu offered (from 1 
to 6) 
Menu offered in t-1 
(from 1 to 6) 
Relative frequency of  
no selection  
Constant 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.793*** 
(0.280) 
0.912*** 
(0.242) 
0.314*** 
(0.057) 
-0.029 
(0.035) 
- 
 
-0.362 
(0.350) 
-0.010** 
(0.004) 
- 
 
1.010*** 
(0.395) 
0.482*** 
(0.084) 
-0.102** 
(0.049) 
- 
 
-0.485 
(0.474) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
- 
 
1.322*** 
(0.400) 
0.186** 
(0.079) 
-0.021 
(0.035) 
0.023*** 
(0.005) 
-0.742 
(0.566) 
-0.025*** 
(0.003) 
- 
 
-0.109 
(0.078) 
0.729*** 
(0.066) 
- 
 
- 
 
-3.235*** 
(0.342) 
Nb observations 2652 780 1832 1440 
                                                 
17
 We include one single menu variable instead of each menu value since the agents’ payoffs increase with each 
higher menu value. 
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Log Likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
Pseudo R
2
 
-773.506 
49.43 
0.000 
0.157 
-291.556 
38.19 
0.000 
0.209 
-363.406 
66.09 
0.000 
0.199 
-822.684 
127.62 
0.000 
0.176 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; ***, and ** denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
 
Specifications (1)-(3) show that high-type agents are more likely to accept a contract offer 
and that higher menus are more likely to be accepted.  Neither of these is particularly surprising, 
since high-type agents have considerably more to lose by rejecting an offer and since higher 
menus are (generally) more favorable to the agents.  There is no difference in acceptance rates 
across agent types in the excess-principals treatment, since agents almost always offered at least 
one favorable contract menu.  Finally, specification (1) indicates that agents are more likely to 
accept a given contract in the excess-agent treatment than in the baseline.   
To analyze the determinants of the choice of option X once a contract has been accepted, 
we have estimated a Probit model with robust standard errors and clustering at the individual 
level on the data of the B and the EA treatments separately.
18
  The independent variables include 
both a time trend (the number of the period) and the number of the menu that has been accepted 
by the agent.  Table 10 reports the results of these regressions. 
Table 10: Determinants of choosing option X once a contract has been accepted 
 (Probit models) 
 
Decision to accept the 
offer 
Benchmark 
Treatment 
(1) 
Excess Agent 
Treatment 
(2) 
Time trend -0.013*** 0.014* 
                                                 
18
  Since low-type agents incur serious losses if they choose the X option, we only consider here the high-type agents. 
We also omit the EP treatment since payoffs are identical for both options X and Y when the equilibrium menu is 
offered. 
 30 
 
Menu accepted (from 
1 to 6) 
Constant 
(0.005) 
0.746*** 
(0.159) 
-1.962*** 
(0.538) 
(0.007) 
0.517*** 
(0.090) 
-0.408* 
(0.220) 
Nb observations 
Log Likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
Pseudo R
2
 
372 
-191.962 
31.39 
0.000 
0.203 
933 
-341.993 
37.74 
0.000 
0.159 
Note: These estimations have been conducted with robust standard errors (in parentheses) and 
clustering at the individual level; ***, and ** denote two-tailed significance at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
Not surprisingly, the higher the contract, the more likely the high agent is to choose option 
X (B treatment: marginal effect = 0.273; EA treatment: marginal effect = 0.104).  The marginal 
effect of the menu offered is lower in EA than in the B treatment, probably due to the competitive 
pressure.  Option X is chosen less frequently over time in the B treatment (marginal effect = -
0.005), as it seems that high-ability agents develop a taste for more favorable contracts and make 
modest sacrifices by choosing Y instead of X (rather than costly rejections) to punish the 
principal for a lack of generosity in choosing menus that give them lower payoffs.  In contrast, 
option X is chosen more frequently over time in the EA treatment (marginal effect = 0.003) since 
the high-ability agents also learn to make modest sacrifices, by choosing X instead of Y when 
they accept contracts 1 or 2, to increase the likelihood of their hiring.  
5.3 Welfare and efficiency comparisons 
Welfare comparisons across treatments are complicated because in EA and EP there is an 
unbalanced structure of principals and agents, so that some parties remain unmatched.  The right 
assumption in this case, we think, is to consider only the individuals who are actually matched; 
equivalently, one might think of this is how much benefit society derives from a match.  More 
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importantly, the numbers of matches with the high-ability agents is likely to be higher in the EA 
treatment, which necessarily gives a boost to the total payoffs in this treatment.  
With the contract menus and payoff parameters we chose, we find that the greatest 
benefits accrue to society when there are many agents competing.  The average total payoffs are 
698.97, 538.46, and 590.42 in the EA, B, and EP treatments, respectively; thus, the EA treatment 
easily yields the highest average total payoff.  One reason for this is that (ex post) every contract 
is accepted by at least one of the paired agents in the EA treatment.  The EP treatment slightly 
dominates B in terms of average total payoff since only two agents reject the offer of both 
principals, while the B treatment has a substantial rejection rate. º 
Nevertheless, even if we consider only accepted contracts, the EA treatment still generates 
the highest degree of efficiency, with average total payoffs of 698.97, 600.71, and 591.36 in the 
EA, B, and EP treatments, respectively.  Mann-Whitney tests find that the total payoffs are higher 
in EA than in both B (Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06) and EP (Z = 2.14 and p = 0.03).  One reason why EA 
empirically yields higher payoffs than B or EP is that the possibility of selection means that there 
are more matches with high-ability agents in EA (81%, against 57% in B and 50% in EP) and 
these yield higher total payoffs per match.  Nevertheless, even if there were an equal number of 
matches with high- and low-ability agents in EA, it would still be the treatment with the highest 
total payoffs, either with or without rejections (615.04). 
However, the conclusion about the higher efficiency of the EA institutional environment 
should be qualified if we account for those agents who get unmatched.  If the EA environment 
provides the biggest benefit to society from a match, it may generate a higher social cost than the 
benchmark if the unmatched agents remain unemployed. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
We conducted an experiment based on a model of contracting under asymmetric 
information.  We show theoretically that, in this context, various degrees of relative bargaining 
power affect outcomes and efficiency.   In this environment, efficiency improves in the relative 
number of agents because competition reduces the agents‟ informational monopoly power.  
However, this environment also generates high inequality levels and is characterized by multiple 
equilibria, which may have important behavioral implications in the field and suggests that 
empirical testing could produce valuable insights. 
Our results provide qualitative support for the theory.  We find that the institutional 
environment in which agents compete against each other improves efficiency with respect to a 
situation without competition.  We also show that behavior evolves over time.  People make 
errors, learn and adjust their decisions accordingly in order to increase their payoffs.  In 
particular, the payoff obtained in the previous period, especially related to the ability to separate 
between types, is a driving force of the evolution of principals‟ menu offers.  Our results also 
indicate that principals offer more generous menus than predicted, although less frequently in the 
context of competition. 
These results offer some insight into the interaction between the various degrees of 
bargaining power and social preferences.  In many experimental papers, the outcomes do not 
correspond to the predictions of standard contract theory; this is often considered to stem from 
some form of social preferences.  In our treatment without competition, we observe that 
principals offer more generous contracts menus than in the equilibrium.  When agents compete, 
principals tend also to offer more generous contract menus than the equilibrium, but this is less 
the case when they are able to separate the agents by type with the equilibrium menus; this calls 
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into question the true generosity of these offers.  In addition, the existence of social preferences 
can hardly change the outcome for the low-ability type agents:  due to the heterogeneity among 
agents, offering a more generous menu increases the selected agent‟s expected payoff but also 
increases the likelihood of the repeated exclusion of the low-ability agents.   
Finally, the superiority of the institutional environment with competition among agents is 
shown in terms of total surplus of the matched pairs.  The higher total surplus is achieved by 
making the payoff of the principal higher and lowering those of the agents.  Thus, there is a 
genuine tradeoff between equity and efficiency in this environment, both theoretically and 
empirically.  
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APPENDIX A - Instructions for the Excess Agent treatment
 
 (the instructions for the other treatments 
are available upon request) 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making carried out by researchers from the 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, the University of California at Santa Barbara and GATE.  During this session, 
you can earn money.  The amount of your earnings depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the 
other participants in this session.  During the session, your earnings will be calculated in points,  
with 100 points = 1 Euro 
During the session, losses are possible.  However, they can be avoided with certainty by your decisions. 
The session consists of 40 independent periods.  Only 4 periods will be chosen at random for actual 
payment, at the end of the session.  The earnings you have made during these 4 periods will be added up 
and converted into Euros.  In addition, you will receive € 4 for participating in the experiment.  Your 
earnings will be paid to you in cash in private to preserve confidentiality. Your decisions are anonymous 
and confidential. 
During this session, there are two categories of participants: 4 participants are proposers and 12 
participants are responders.  The responders can be of two types: A or B.  
The category to which the participant is assigned (proposer or responder) and the type of participant in 
the case the participant is a responder are chosen randomly at the beginning of the session. Each 
responder has an equal initial probability to be of either type A or type B.  Half of all responders will be 
of each type.  
You will be informed of your category and of your type if you are a responder at the beginning of the 
session and you will keep the same category and the same type throughout the session.  If you are a 
responder, no one knows your type. 
Description of each period 
At the beginning of each period, each proposer is randomly matched with 3 responders.  The responders 
may be either type, but the proposer does not know their types when making a proposal.  The identity of 
your co-participants is unknown to you.  The composition of the group changes randomly every period. 
Each period consists of four stages. 
 In the first stage, the proposer makes a selection from one of 6 possible “offers” {1,2,3,4,5 or 6} 
by checking a box on his screen. 
 In the second stage, the three responders are informed of this offer.  Each can then choose one 
either option X or option Y or “rejection” by checking the corresponding box on his screen.  
 In the third stage, the proposer is informed of the choices of the three responders.  If more than 
one responder has accepted the proposer‟s offer, the proposer will select one of the responders 
among those who accepted his offer. He can accept at most one responder.  The responders are 
not informed about the choices made by the other responders. The responders who have not been 
selected receive a payoff of 125 points. 
 In the fourth stage, each person is informed of his own payoff in that period. 
 
How are payoffs calculated? 
The payoffs depend on the offer made by the proposer, on the responders‟ decisions and on the choice 
made by the proposer among the responders. When a proposer chooses a responder, his payoff depends 
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only on his offer and on the option chosen by this responder; the responders who have not been selected 
do not provide him with any additional payoff.  
 
Please refer to the Table provided.  This Table displays the 6 possible offers and their associated payoffs. 
Corresponding to each offer, you can see 3 rows: 
- The first row, in blue, indicates the payoffs of the proposer.  
- The second row, in yellow, indicates the responder‟s payoffs if his type is A. 
- The third row, in pink, indicates the responder‟s payoffs if his type is B. 
The 3 columns represent the decisions made by the responder: 
- The column (1) corresponds to the choice of option X if the responder accepts the offer  
- The column (2) corresponds to the choice of option Y if the responder accepts the offer  
- The column (3) corresponds to the case of the responder rejects the offer. 
 
At the intersection of a row and a column, you can read the payoffs associated with an offer and a choice 
as a function of the role of proposer or responder. 
  
Here are some examples. 
Example 1. The proposer has chosen the offer 1.  One responder of type B has accepted this offer and 
chosen option Y.  The two other responders have rejected this offer.  In this case, the proposer will 
receive 355 points; the responder who has accepted the offer will receive 135 points; the responders who 
have rejected the offer will receive 125 points. 
Example 2. The proposer has chosen the offer 3.  One responder of type A and one responder of type B 
have accepted this offer and chosen option Y; the other responder of type A has also accepted the offer 
and chosen option X.  The proposer chooses the responder who chose option X.  The proposer will 
receive 550 points; the responder who has been chosen will receive 210 points; the responders who have 
not been chosen will receive 125 points. 
Example 3. If the proposer has chosen the offer 6 and if no responder has accepted his offer, both the 
proposer and the responders receive 125 points. 
 
To sum up, in each period, if you are a proposer, you choose an offer from among the six feasible options 
and you choose between the responders who have accepted your offer; you cannot accept more than one 
responder.  If you are a responder, you choose either option X or option Y or you reject the offer.  Your 
payoffs for the current period are then computed. 
At the end of a period, a new period starts automatically.  Each period is independent.  
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand.  Your questions will 
be immediately answered in private.  Throughout the entire session, direct communication between 
participants is strictly forbidden.  
 
 38 
APPENDIX B - Nonparametric tests 
 
Our nonparametric tests are Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum tests, conducted with both 
session-level and individual-level data.  In a strict sense each session is only one independent observation, 
since there is interaction between parties over the course of each session.  Table A presents a summary of 
principal and agent choices in each of our sessions. 
 
Table A: Session-level data 
Variables B treatment  EA treatment  EP treatment 
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 
Average offer 3.41 3.50 2.53 2.51 2.07 3.04 5.08 5.11 5.05 
Rejection rates (M 1, 2 & 3) 0.23 0.38 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.04 - - - 
High agent-option X (M 1& 2) 0.00 0.00 0.52 0.50 0.82 0.56 - - - 
High agent-option X (M 3) 0.75 0.26 0.87 0.96 1.00 0.96 - - - 
% high type (actual contracts) 0.56 0.57 0.74 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.50 
 
The average contract menu offered is lowest in the four EA sessions and highest in the three EP 
sessions.  Rank-sum tests find Z = 2.12 and p = 0.03, comparing between EA and EP, Z = 1.85 and p = 
0.06 for the comparison between EA and B, and Z =1.73 and p = 0.08 for the comparison between B and 
EP.  The likelihood that EA < B < EP (for average menu offered) is only p = 0.004.  Principals offer 
significantly different contract menus in each treatment. 
We also see that rejection rates of the less generous menus (1-3) are substantially higher in both B 
sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, yielding Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06.
19
  In addition, high-ability 
agents in the B treatment are less likely to choose option X in response to menus 1 and 2 than are high-
ability agents in the EA treatment (insufficient observations in the EP treatment); recall that the myopic 
profit-maximizing choice in the EA treatment is Y.  As the rate is lower in both B sessions than in any of 
the four EA sessions; this gives Z = 1.88 and p = 0.06.  The rate of option X being chosen by the high 
agent is lower in both B sessions than in any of the four EA sessions, with Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06.  This is 
consistent with the fact that the offer of menu 3 is already more „generous‟ than the equilibrium in the EA 
treatment.  Finally, the proportion of high-ability agents in the actual contracts is higher in the EA 
sessions than in the B sessions (Z = 1.85 and p = 0.06) and it is smaller than a random draw of 0.875 (p = 
0.04, t-test).   This proportion is also higher in the B than in the EP sessions (p = 0.08) and it is larger than 
a random draw of 0.50 (p = 0.01, t-test). 
Since we have only a few sessions in each treatment, we supplement these tests by collapsing the 
40 choices of each participant to one number; while this approach ignores the interaction between parties, 
we feel it is nevertheless informative.  These results confirm the patterns above, but with a higher degree 
of statistical significance.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests find that there are significant differences in 
the average menu offered between each pair of treatments (Z = 3.99, 5.71, and 5.69 for EA vs. B, EA vs. 
EP, and B vs. EP, respectively; all of these test statistics give p < 0.001).  The test also indicates that the 
rejection rates of menus 1-3 are significantly higher in the B treatment than in the EA treatment (Z = 2.60, 
p = 0.01). Finally, the test confirms that the proportion of high-ability agents in the actual contracts is 
                                                 
19
 We choose menus 1-3 as there are few rejections of menus 4-6 and these all occurred in the B treatment. 
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larger in the EA than in the B treatment (Z = 4.36, p < 0.001) but this test fails when comparing the B 
and EP treatments (Z = 1.56, p = 0.11). 
